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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
Task four of the collaborative effort between ORNL, Brazil, and Westinghouse 
for the International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative entitled “Development 
of Advanced Instrumentation and Control for an Integrated Primary System 
Reactor” focused on the design of the hierarchical supervisory control for 
multiple-module units. The state of the IRIS plant design – specifically, the lack 
of a detailed secondary system design – made developing a detailed hierarchical 
control difficult at this time. However, other simultaneous and ongoing efforts 
have contributed to providing the needed information. 
This report summarizes the results achieved under Task four. Section 1.2 
describes the scope of this effort. Section 2 discusses the IRIS control 
functions. Next, it briefly reviews the current control concepts, and then 
follows this by reviewing the maneuvering requirements for the IRIS plant. It 
closes by noting the benefits that automated sequences have in reducing 
operator workload. Section 3 examines reactor loading in the frequency domain 
to establish some guidelines for module operation, paying particular attention 
to strategies for using process steam for desalination and/or district heating. 
The final subsection discusses the implications for reactor control, and argues 
that using the envisioned percentage (up to 10%) of the NSSS thermal output 
for these purposes should not significantly affect the NSSS control strategies. 
Section 4 uses some very general economic assumptions to suggest how one 
should approach multi-module operation.  It concludes that the well-known 
algorithms used for economic dispatching could be used to help manage a 
multi-unit IRIS site. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
1.2. SCOPE 
The INERI contract scope of work task description for task 4, “supervisory 
hierarchical control design,” is as follows: 
1. “Task Description  
“The IRIS control system architecture is being designed by 
the Instrumentation and Control Department of the Nuclear 
Automation Business Segment of Westinghouse. The 
architecture has been developed for a single unit plant 
having only electricity as its output. While this is consistent 
with one of the possible applications of the IPSRs1 
                                       
1 IPSR=Integrated Primary Systems Reactor 
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technology and is consistent with the mission of other LWR 
designs, it fails to account for other IPSR applications that 
have been envisioned. Multiple units per site and 
cogeneration are part of the envisioned applications for 
IPSRs. Multiple unit operation must be optimized to 
successfully compete for deployment in countries where 
large electricity generation is required and can be supported, 
while small single unit size is attractive for countries with 
limited grid infrastructure. Co-generation applications are of 
interest to both developed and developing countries. 
“An optimization of the plant operation for these different 
applications will not impact the overall low level control 
schemes, but will require the design of an appropriate 
supervisory hierarchical control, possibly capable of 
reconfiguring the balance of plant for different applications 
to provide a high level plant operation control. The main 
purpose of a supervisory control is to regulate the operation 
of the plant under different conditions and to reduce the 
operating staffing requirements.  
“While the single unit supervisory control design will also be 
addressed, the main objective of this program is to develop 
an approach for different applications, either in a multi-unit 
park or for dual purpose plants.” 
The following section taken from the original proposal (Ref. 1) provides 
additional insight into the original intent of this task: 
2. “Supervisory Control Strategy Development 
“Westinghouse has previously developed a supervisory 
control strategy for the management of a single IRIS module 
during any operating range between hot zero power and hot 
full power. This supervisory control approach is IRIS specific 
(in particular it accounts for the transition modes between 
low and high power feedwater system control) but it is still 
based on Westinghouse technology, and in particular the 
most recent digital control system architectures. In this task, 
Westinghouse will address specific modes of operation 
envisioned for the IRIS reactor, including the control of 
multiple modules and the possibility of coupling the plant 
with desalination, district heating, and industrial steam co-
generation modules. In addition, more advanced solutions 
will be explored, for example the possibility of switching 
between power production and desalination for a unit with a 
reconfigurable balance of plant. This task will address all the 
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necessary engineering and design issues that are required to 
properly characterize these modes of operation, but the 
focus will be on the design of the hierarchical supervisory 
control. ORNL will implement the developed simulation 
models and supervisory control module onto its I&C test bed 
as a combined system demonstration.” 
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2. IRIS CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
The vision for IRIS is for more than just a single-unit electric power generating 
station: it includes (1) an expectation for multiple units on one site, and (2) the 
possibility of coupling the plant with desalination, district heating, and 
industrial steam co-generation modules. There are numerous detailed issues 
involved that we cannot resolve without having more specific information, such 
as the number of units, the specific functions (electric, desalination, district 
heating, etc.) available on each, and the economic information needed to 
support specific control decisions; however, we can simplify the problem at this 
time by recognizing that the IRIS Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) is 
simply that: a steam supply. In anthropomorphic language, IRIS does not care 
from where it gets its feedwater or for what we choose to use its steam: all IRIS 
knows is feedwater and steam flows and thermodynamic conditions. The IRIS 
design and the laws of thermodynamics constrain the acceptable steady-state 
feedwater and steam conditions in ways already established by other studies. 
As long as we design the secondary to supply feedwater and accept steam with 
flows and properties compatible with those constraints, IRIS will function 
properly as an NSSS. Let us look at the effects this has on (1) multi-unit 
coordination and (2) multi-use control for a single unit. 
2.1. CONTROL CONCEPTS 
Our earlier work (Ref. 2) proposed a conceptual design for controlling a single 
IRIS unit configured for electric power generation. In that report, we 
concentrated on the following control loops: 
1. Supervisory control 
2. Control rods 
a. Reactor power control during startup 
b. Primary loop temperature control at power 
3. Pressurizer control 
4. Steam generator control (i.e., determining feedwater flow) 
5. Turbine control 
6. Turbine bypass (a.k.a. steam dump) control 
Although one cannot generally say “what controls what” in multi-input, multi-
output systems, one can say where the control systems apply integral terms 
associated with particular errors. In Appendix A to Reference 2, Thomas Wilson 
and Richard Wood recommended pairing “the reactor average temperature with 
reactor power, core thermal power demand with total feedwater flow and steam 
pressure with steam flow.” We concurred with these recommendations for 
normal power operation, and developed a conceptual control approach 
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accordingly. We also considered startup operation, and proposed the following 
associations: 
Variable 
Reactor 
tripped 
Hot zero 
power 
Turbine 
startup 
Low 
Power 
High 
Power 
Control Rods N/A Qn Qn Qn Tavg 
Qn stabilized 
Feedwater 
flow 
ΔPsg ΔPsg ΔPsg ΔPsg Qref 
Steam flow to 
turbine 
N/A N/A rpm Ps Ps 
Steam dump Ps Ps Ps Biased Ps Biased Ps 
 
Finally, we developed the framework for a unit supervisory control that would 
coordinate the reactor, feedwater and turbine control systems during normal 
startup, power operation, and shutdown. The supervisory control would have 
the following functions: 
• Establish the plant power reference signal. The IRIS plant is an 
electric power generating station, and the natural choice is 
generator electric power. The power reference signal will be used 
to derive reference and/or feedforward signals for the other major 
control loops. 
• Monitor plant conditions and determine/coordinate the 
appropriate operating modes for the major control systems. 
Reference 2 outlined the basic control strategies and provided a conceptual 
design for single-unit operation limited to electric power generation. We 
included a number of recommendations for further study, one of which, “Add 
external interfaces for any proposed multi-unit coordination (e.g., remote 
dispatching)” has particular direct bearing on the current study. 
2.2. MANEUVERING REQUIREMENTS 
Our earlier report proposed the following maneuvering requirements for IRIS 
units configured for electrical power generation: 
1. Normal transients 
A. Startup Transients 
i. Initial turbine loading 
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B. Power change transients 
i. Daily load follow 
ii. Ramp load changes 
iii. Step load changes 
iv. Grid frequency control 
C. Shutdown transients 
D. Event-based transients 
i. Startup ↔ main feedwater mode switching 
ii. Bypass ↔ main feedwater valve 
iii. One ↔ two main feedwater pumps 
2. Abnormal events 
A. Approach to protection or operational limits 
B. Reactor trip 
C. Turbine trip 
D. Generator trip 
E. Switchyard breaker trip 
F. Islanding 
G. Turbine fast valving 
H. Feedwater pump trip 
I. Reactor coolant pump trip 
J. Feedwater and condensate train functions 
The report proposed requirements for each of these events, and we will refine 
these requirements in Section 5 of the present report. At this time, there are 
few modifications necessary, although there are still several open issues. The 
primary change is to move “step load changes” to a third high-level category, 
“reference transients.” We had already established that step changes in 
electrical load were not realistic transients, but were useful for control system 
design and analysis. Detailed analyses conducted since 2004 showed that 
using the control system design proposed then and subjecting the plant to a 
true step change in electrical load (i.e., a change from one finite grid to another 
of different size) did not result in any significant change in reactor output; 
instead, the energy mismatch forced the finite grid to accept the power 
mismatch by altering frequency. The reason, of course, is that the conceptual 
design developed in 2004 did not have a frequency correction to the reference 
power demand. Most grids are predominantly (say, ~70%) motor loads. These 
motors usually drive loads whose power consumption increases with speed 
(roughly as a quadratic function of grid frequency). Excess power generation 
forces the motors to increase speed until the loads reach speeds that consume 
the excess power; while insufficient power causes the motors to slow down 
until the load requirements drop to match the available power. 
One solution would be to add a frequency correction to the reference power 
demand. Although this might be acceptable if the unit operates on an isolated 
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grid, the preferred approach would be to recognize this as an islanding event 
and treat it with its own control mode (as recommended in Ref. 2). 
Westinghouse adopted this approach on the Temelín units in the Czech 
Republic, and the system has worked successfully when needed. 
Frequency change issues do not arise for step changes in unit demand signals 
if the unit remains connected to an infinite grid. Under these conditions, a step 
change in requested electrical power generation would lead to a rapid change 
in generation at a rate limited by plant components (e.g., feedwater valve stroke 
time) and by any rate limits in the control systems. Generated frequency would 
remain at or near the nominal grid frequency throughout the event. 
Reference 2 left “open issues” for us to decide which of the abnormal events 
must be in the IRIS plant design bases. The bases almost certainly should 
include the first five, and probably fast valving and islanding as well. The need 
to survive a feedwater pump trip will depend on the final feedwater system 
design, as will the need to survive specific feedwater and condensate train 
upsets. We do not currently promise the ability to operate with reactor coolant 
pumps out of service, but providing the capability makes an attractive area for 
future study. Section 5.2 provides a preliminary list along with the associated 
functional requirements. 
2.3. AUTOMATED SEQUENCES 
The IRIS program considers allowing one operating crew to monitor multiple 
units. Task 5 addressing human factors should consider this issue in more 
detail; however, it is clear that automating certain sequences associated with 
plant startup and shutdown could reduce the burden on the operators. The 
Westinghouse Supervisory Sequential Controller Interface (SSCI) system 
(Ref. 3) is an on-line, workstation-based system designed for operating 
procedure and sequential control applications in both power plants and 
process control facilities. The primary goal of the system is to provide a 
graphical user interface that allows for either user paced or system paced 
movement through plant operating procedures and control sequences. SSCI 
has the capability of monitoring plant status and issuing commands to plant 
control systems. By utilizing such a system to automate primary- and 
secondary-side startup and shutdown sequences, the IRIS I&C system could 
reduce operator workload compared to traditional non-automated systems. 
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3. MULTI-USE COORDINATION 
Expanding the plant vision beyond electric power generation to include 
desalination and/or district heating capability expands the need for secondary 
side design input. Although we do not have this input today, we can still make 
some observations by looking at the load variations each would place on IRIS. 
Specifically, we will consider quasi-steady state, daily load changes, hourly 
fluctuations, and minute-by-minute fluctuations. 
3.1. QUASI-STEADY STATE 
The simplest changes are those that occur over weeks or months. IRIS will, of 
course, have long-term variations in operating capability due to fuel depletion, 
steam generator fouling, equipment wear, and the occasional refueling outage. 
There may be seasonal demand changes for electricity, desalinated water, and 
district heating. We do not see that any of these pose significant new operating 
concerns for IRIS. 
3.2. DAILY FLUCTUATIONS 
The IRIS core will be susceptible to xenon-induced power distribution 
oscillations in the same way that similar PWR cores are. These oscillations 
have a period of just over a day, so daily power changes tend to initiate and 
support sustained oscillations. The core design recognizes this, and core 
operating strategies address the concerns. The important issue for IRIS is to 
avoid asking for daily power variations beyond the core design bases. 
Historically, these bases addressed daily fluctuations in electric power demand: 
for most grids, the demand for electric power decrease at night and on 
weekends. Since most grids have no practical means of storing electricity2, 
electric generation must follow these daily load variations. One feature of the 
Westinghouse Remote Dispatch Interface System mentioned earlier is its ability 
to account for xenon distributions in determining plant load change capability. 
District heating demand should have a daily component, but in this case one 
would expect greater demand at night. If so, swings in district heating demand 
might partially offset swings in electricity demand, although we expect the 
effect would be small in most areas. Desalination demand could behave 
differently: although the demand for fresh water might peak at the same time 
as the demand for electricity, very simple technology (a tank) allows us to store 
desalinated water for later use. This suggests doing more of the desalination 
during times of low electric demand (night & weekends) and less during times 
                                       
2 Pumped storage is perhaps the only credible option and then only in favorable terrain. 
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of high electric demand (weekdays) to help balance the load demand 
throughout the day. As a side note, if the differential cost curve is convex (most 
are, at least at high power), then balancing load throughout the day has direct 
economic benefits as well. 
3.3. HOURLY FLUCTUATIONS 
Neither electric demand, district heating demand, nor desalination demand 
should have pronounced hourly variations commensurate with the daily 
fluctuations, nor should the IRIS plant have resonant frequencies in this band 
as it does for faster and slower events. Small fluctuations in this frequency 
range generally do not contribute to significant component fatigue, and wear 
should be less than it is for faster events. Designing the secondary to allow 
offsetting electric power demand fluctuations with desalination has benefits in 
this frequency range as well. 
3.4. MINUTE-BY-MINUTE FLUCTUATIONS 
Plants that have automatic load dispatching see electric power demand 
changes on a minute-by-minute bases, and most plants see smaller and faster 
fluctuations due to local frequency control. Each of these is more pronounced 
on smaller, less stable grids. Unfortunately, the NSSS has numerous time 
constants that lie in the few seconds to few minutes range, and steam flow 
fluctuations in this range tend to drive significant oscillations. Tight control 
may not be possible, and may even be undesirable because of the wear on 
control actuators (notable the control rod drive mechanisms). Traditional 
Westinghouse strategy has been to widen control deadbands during automatic 
dispatching to allow larger swings while reducing actuator demands; 
Westinghouse’s U.S. patent 4,707,324 provides a more sophisticated approach 
that adjusts both set point and deadband to account for the expected process 
variable response to load fluctuations. 
To our knowledge, there is no a-priori reason to expect desalination or district 
heating to contribute toward these fluctuations, so addressing those lies 
outside the scope of this study. 
3.5. REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS 
Reference 4 outlines the available desalination options. The Reverse Osmosis 
(RO) process relies mostly on electricity but may use steam to preheat the 
seawater. Multi-Stage Flash Distillation (MFD) and Multi-Effect Distillation 
(MED) each use steam as the principal energy source to evaporate seawater. 
The authors note, “The production of desalinated water is energy 
intensive....The choice of the desalination technology determines the energy 
required: electrical energy for reverse osmosis systems, relatively low quality 
thermal energy for distillation systems, and both electrical and thermal energy 
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for hybrid systems such as pre-heat RO systems.” Their economic analyses 
suggested that a reverse osmosis desalination unit could provide water at 
approximately half the cost of an MSF unit. Since a pure reverse osmosis 
option uses electricity without requiring process steam, the desalination unit is 
simply another electric customer. The reverse osmosis option considered in 
their table 1 would require less than 16 MWe to operate. The IRIS unit need 
have no special control provisions to support this option. 
Reference 4 considered coupling an IRIS plant with a MSF distillation unit by 
using low-pressure turbine extraction steam as a heat source. The paper does 
not state the thermal requirements, but presumably the authors assumed less 
than 5 percent of the reactor thermal power output. Reference 5 considered 
two larger MED options, requiring 200 and 150 MWt respectively, again using 
extraction steam as the heat source. Naturally, all valves and pumps in an 
MED or MFD interface will require controls, but there should be little impact 
on the reactor controls. To see this, consider the Westinghouse experience with 
district heating on the two Temelín units. 
The Temelín units are 3000 MWt units that can supply 340 MWt of district 
heating to the town of Týn, Czech Republic. On a percentage basis, this is two 
to three times the percentage envisioned for IRIS in references 4 and 5. The 
heat source was a mix of extraction steam from various low- and high-pressure 
turbine stages3. When supplying full district heating, electricity production 
decreased 5-6%. The effect on the reactor is minimal. During normal operation, 
the Temelín reactor control system acts to maintain primary temperature in 
the same way envisioned for IRIS. The Temelín design uses turbine load to 
select the desired operating temperature, but relies only on the rate-of-change 
of turbine load for fast transient response. The IRIS control system design 
proposed in Reference 2 takes the same approach. The Temelín reactor 
controls do not require or receive any signals indicating whether district 
heating is in use, so it seems reasonable that the IRIS reactor controls may not 
require any inputs indicating whether or not extraction steam is being used for 
desalination, district heating, or other purposes. Naturally, the supervisory 
control may need to account for the thermal loss to the turbine when setting 
control system reference values. 
                                       
3 At maximum district heating load, the Temelín design required less than half of the turbine 
extraction steam for district heating. Designers could increase the district heating capability 
on new plants by using more extraction steam and/or using live steam as the heat source. 
The limit is to use all generated steam for district heating and none for electric generation. 
Since one normally prefers using low-pressure extraction steam as the district heating heat 
source, the relationship between district heating power and lost electric generation is 
nonlinear. 
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4. MULTI-UNIT COORDINATION 
Reference 2 focused on operating a single unit. When multiple units sit on one 
site, the primary criteria for operating the set should be an economic one 
constrained by technological issues. 
Consider a site with multiple IRIS NSSS modules. For simplicity, assume that 
the modules are identical. The cost of operating a single module will have fixed 
and variable cost components. The fixed costs include capital and non-capital 
costs. Although capital costs are important, their impact will be included in 
plant sizing decisions. Once the plant is built, capital costs should not directly 
affect operating decisions. For example, a combined electric-desalination plant 
would need a larger, more expensive desalination unit to produce the same 
fresh water volume if desalination only occurred part time. Once we have built 
the plant, the desalination unit capital costs no longer affect the decision of 
how much electricity and fresh water to produce at this minute. The installed 
desalination capacity, of course, affects the decision as a constraint on the rate 
at which we can process water. We will treat capital costs as sunk costs and 
say no more about them. The remaining non-capital fixed costs are, by 
definition, not affected by how we operate the plant, so they should not affect 
our operational strategy either. This leaves only the need to consider variable 
costs. 
The variable cost will almost certainly be a monotonically increasing function 
of operating power – it is hard to imagine that it would be otherwise, especially 
considering the importance of fuel cost. If the IRIS NSSS module is optimized 
for full power operation, then the differential operating cost (defined by the 
slope of the variable cost vs. power curve) will decrease with increasing power. 
In practice, factors such as turbine admission valve sequencing may not allow 
the differential cost curve to be monotonic or even continuous over the entire 
achievable power range. Ideally, the unconstrained differential operating cost 
curve reaches zero at full power so that full power operation is the optimum 
economic operating point; invariably it will be positive because the additional 
power cannot be free. 
Now consider operating several NSSSs in parallel to supply a given total power. 
One goal is to provide the required power at minimum cost. This is a 
constrained optimization problem. Letting ( )PC ii  be the variable cost associated 
with operating module i at power Pi , the optimization problem is to minimize 
the total cost subject to the total power constraint, i.e.: 
( )∑ =∑ =− = N1i ii0PP:P PCminN 1i itotali . 
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Solve this by using Lagrange multipliers. Define the Lagrange function as 
follows: 
( ) ( )∑∑ == −λ+ N1i iTotalN1i ii PPPC  
A necessary condition for solving the minimization problem is that ( ) 0
Pd
PCd
i
ii =λ− ; i.e., every unit operates at the same differential cost per unit 
power λ. If each unit has the same differential cost curve (reasonable for 
identical units), then the solution is to have each unit operate at the same 
power; specifically, 
N
PP Totali = . This simple analysis ignored the maximum and 
minimum power limits on each module. Although one can easily extend the 
analysis to include these inequality constraints, the solution is obvious. There 
are three cases: 
1. If PNPPN MaxiTotalMini << , then we operate each unit at N
PP Totali =  as 
before. 
2. If PNP MaxiTotal > , then the plant cannot supply the desired total 
power. The best it can do is to operate each available unit at full 
power. 
3. If PNP MiniTotal < , then the plant cannot supply the desired total 
power with all units running. The solution requires shutting down 
one or more units. Generally, one would shut down as many as 
possible while still being able to supply the required power. 
One should extend the analysis to include time- and site-specific information 
when that information becomes available. Such information should include 
short-term operating constraints: for example, refueling unit i is merely a 
constraint that 0Pi = . All solutions, however, have the common feature that the 
economic optimum operation occurs when the units that are free to do so 
operate at the same differential cost. 
To illustrate the complexity that can arise in even simple applications, consider 
three units with the following total and differential operating cost 
characteristics in some fictitious monetary unit §: 
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Total Operating Cost
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For simplicity, this example assumes that all three units are the same size 
(100 MW). For constraints, let us assume that each unit could operate 
continuously between 20 and 100 MW. Unit C is the least expensive at low 
power, while unit A has the lowest differential cost at high power. The curves 
assumed the following total cost for each unit: 
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In these equations, powers are in fraction of full power and h=0.10 (equivalent 
to 10 MW) is the offset from linearity at 50% power (we will see that the 
optimum operating strategy is the same for all 25.0h0 ≤< ). The associated 
differential cost curves are as follows: 
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These three units can produce any combination from 20 to 300 MW. The 
optimal cost solution has seven constraints: a minimum and a maximum for 
each unit and a total power constraint. Carrying out the calculations results in 
the following loading plan: 
1. From 20 to 50 MW, use unit C since it is the cheapest unit to 
operate. 
2. The differential operating cost of unit B is less than that of unit C 
when unit C is operating at more than 50 MW, but since the 
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minimum allowable load on unit C is 20 MW, we should continue 
to use unit C alone up to 60 MW. At 60 MW, it is cheaper to bring 
unit B on line than it is to increase power from unit C. From 60 to 
70 MW, use unit B for 20 MW, and unit C for the remainder. 
3. At 70 MW, unit C has reached 50 MW and the differential cost 
curves show that it is cheaper to increase power on unit B than 
on unit C. From 70 to 150 MW, use unit C for 50 MW, and unit B 
for the remainder. From 150 to 160 MW, use unit B for 100 MW, 
and unit C for the remainder. 
4. At 160 MW it becomes cheaper to operate unit A at full power and 
make up the difference with the others. From 160 to 300 MW, 
operate unit A at full output and make up the remainder as 
indicated in steps 2 or 3 as appropriate. 
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As we see, rather simple economic parameters can lead to moderately complex 
operating strategies if the units are not identical. Even with smooth operating 
cost curves, the constraints can lead to significant discontinuities in how the 
optimum power generation mix varies with total required power. This example 
did not consider the cost of starting a unit or shutting one down, nor the 
constraints on doing so. For example, xenon transients may prevent restarting 
a unit shortly after it shuts down. Startup and shutdown also increase 
operator workload, and some tasks (particularly bringing a reactor critical and 
synchronizing a generator) should probably demand operator action, even if 
only to provide permission. 
Although there are complexities not considered in this example, methods for 
determining the optimum are straightforward and well known. Reference 6 
provides many details. The optimization algorithms work best when they 
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account for the current plant operating limits. In the early 1980’s, 
Westinghouse developed a Remote Dispatch Interface System that provided the 
information that a remote dispatch computer would need to incorporate unit 
operating constraints into the economic optimization. IRIS could use a similar 
system for each unit, and combine the results at the site Supervisory Control 
level, interfacing with remote dispatching as if the site were a single unit. The 
Supervisory Control would then perform site optimization locally. The concept 
could extend naturally to incorporate other proposed uses such as providing 
steam for desalination or district heating. 
If one operating crew has to monitor multiple units, operating and 
maneuvering all units at the same power may or may not be the optimal 
arrangement from a human factors perspective. Task 5 addressing human 
factors should consider this issue. 
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5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS: PLANT MANEUVERING 
CAPABILITY 
This section identifies the plant maneuverability requirements for normal 
power operation and selected abnormal conditions (specifically, abnormal 
conditions that do not involve damage to plant equipment as the initiating 
event), as well as reference events identified to provide a robust design. The 
discussions describe the relevant event and then define the precise conditions 
assumed for its initiation and successful compliance. Figure 1 provides a 
simplified view of the requirements.  
The IRIS design is not finalized, and there is considerable opportunity to 
modify or change the design. These requirements reflect the following 
assumptions: 
• There are no pressurizer relief valves. 
• There are no steam line safety valves upstream of the isolation valves, 
but there are safety valves in the lower-pressure piping downstream of 
the isolation valves. 
• There are no steam line relief valves upstream of the isolation valves, but 
there are relief valves in the lower-pressure piping downstream of the 
isolation valves. 
The following subsections follow a standardized requirements format. We use 
one subsection for each event type, and write each event subsection in a stand-
alone manner. Although this leads to some repeating some description and 
some requirement text, the additional rigor helps ensure that each requirement 
has one and only one application; thereby facilitating design verification. Each 
event subsection begin with introductory text that provides background 
information and defines any necessary terms and/or conditions. The second 
part is a list of detailed requirements, starting with a formal requirement 
identifier. Sometimes we provide qualifiers (such as guidance or exception 
statements) to clarify specific requirements. 
Except for a few obvious exceptions (e.g., 100%, 24 hours), ALL numerical 
values in this section are preliminary and subject to change. We included them 
to give an indication of their possible magnitude, but we must perform the 
necessary and appropriate trade-off studies before accepting any of these as 
final. 
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5.1. NORMAL EVENTS 
5.1.1. ROUTINE POWER OPERATION 
5.1.1.1 LOAD FOLLOW 
Daily load follow refers to 24-hour cycles operating at high power during 
periods of low demand and reducing load during periods of low demand. Many 
nuclear units avoid load follow, some load follow only on weekends, and others 
may load follow daily. From a control systems perspective, the ramp load 
changes bound the transients that normal load follow imposes on the reactor 
coolant system, steam generator, secondary system, and turbine. Daily load 
follow leads to power distribution and xenon-135 transients in the core. The 
core designers must accommodate these in designing their core operating 
strategy. 
Typical design load follow patterns involve operating at full power during the 
day, then ramping to a lower power over several hours, remaining at the low 
power (typically 50 %) overnight, and then slowly ramping back to full power. 
Six hours at low power not only approximates realistic utility demands, but 
also approximates the most limiting time from a xenon transient perspective. 
The design basis load follow pattern consists of one or more repetitions of 
identical 24-hour patterns that meet the following criteria, followed by three 
days of full power operation: 
• Generated electrical power ramps from 100 percent to 50 percent in 2 
hours, and then 
• Generated electrical power remains at 50 percent for 2 to 10 hours, and 
then 
• Generated electrical power ramps from 50 percent to 100 percent in 2 
hours, and then 
• Generated electrical power remains at 100 percent for the remainder of 
the 24-hour cycle (i.e., 18 to 10 hours). 
The conditions for the design-basis load follow are as follows: 
• The load changes results from operator requests to the turbine control 
system. 
• The load following occurs in the first 90% of the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
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• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to daily load follow 
operations (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-
basis load follow pattern. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the 
design-basis load follow pattern without manual intervention. 
Exception: (1) The operator may enter commands that define and 
request following a daily load follow pattern. (2) The operator 
may define the desired target axial offset (or equivalent) 
versus power and/or time. (3) The operator may make boron 
concentration reductions to account for core burnup. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
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[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause the parameter used to initiate the 
transient to overshoot or undershoot its settings by more than 30% of 
the setting change of the setting change required to initiate a 10% or -
10% step. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
load follow pattern shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine 
inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.18] The IRIS plant shall not require CVCS boration 
or dilution operations for axial offset control during load follow 
operation. 
Exception: Dilution to account for burnup is permitted, and may be 
timed to assist in power distribution control. 
[IRIS.DailyLoadFollow.1.19] The I&C System shall provide for automatic 
axial offset control during load follow operation. 
Guidance: The operator may define the desired target axial offset (or 
equivalent) versus power and/or time. The preference is to 
provide automatic axial offset target definition. 
5.1.1.2 DISPATCHED LOAD CHANGES 
Grid frequency control is one of the most important factors in maintaining 
electric grid stability, since grid frequency is the fundamental indicator for 
determining the balance between generation and consumption. Nuclear units 
may not participate in controlling grid frequency on large grids, but frequency 
control capability will be essential for small grids and grids with a high nuclear 
generating component. Power plants have three means to address variations in 
grid frequency: remote load dispatching, and local frequency control. Local 
frequency control occurs when the turbine control system uses a frequency 
corrector to respond to grid frequency changes. Unless the grid is particularly 
small, these variations are usually negligible. Remote load dispatching involves 
larger changes that result when a central office coordinates grid power 
generation. The load change requests may be performed by the operator (as 
discussed earlier) or automatically (as in this section). One normally assumes 
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that the plant remains connected to an infinite grid. The load changes 
associated with remote load dispatching are generally slower than those 
associated with local frequency control, but often involve larger power changes, 
making them more limiting from a design perspective. This imposes severe 
transients on the plant, and component wear and fatigue become major 
concerns. Typical design limits involve ±5 % fluctuations, and restrict or forbid 
remote load dispatching near full power. The frequency spectrum associated 
with the power changes is critical, and most utilities do not have the 
information needed to specify what their needs are in a useful form. 
The design-basis dispatched load change pattern involves small changes in 
power satisfying the following conditions: 
• Dispatched load changes involve small remotely-generated changes in 
demanded electrical power generation. 
• Dispatched load change may be superimposed on either (1) a constant 
power demand or (2) the ramp power changes that occur during the 
design basis load follow pattern (both capabilities required). 
• Dispatched load changes may occur simultaneously with frequency 
control. 
• Demanded electric power remains between 50 and 100 percent at all 
times. 
• The demanded power changes are equivalent to a stochastic process with 
a normalized autocorrelation function R(T)=1.25 Exp[-Abs(T/5)] - 0.25 
Exp[-Abs(T/1)] followed by hard limits. T is given in minutes. (The 
description of the stochastic process given here is based on its simplicity 
rather than on known needs. We should gather hard data to define this 
better). 
• The magnitude of the non-limited power change request does not exceed 
±3.5 percent rms. 
• The limited power changes do not exceed ±5.0% (i.e., peak-to-peak 
changes do not exceed 10%). 
• Dispatched load changes about a constant power demand can occur at 
any time during the core cycle. 
• Dispatched load changes about the design basis load follow pattern can 
occur at any time in the core cycle that the design basis load follow 
pattern is permitted and achievable (i.e., at least the first 90% of the core 
cycle). 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state (transients associated 
with daily load follow excepted, e.g., I-135 and Xe-135 need not be in 
steady state). 
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• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to dispatched load 
change operations (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the 
design-basis dispatched load change pattern. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform 
the design-basis dispatched load change pattern without requiring 
manual intervention. 
Exception: Routine operations associated with the underlying daily load 
follow. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not create diverging 
oscillations in any plant process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, 
flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause a turbine 
runback. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause any pressurizer 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause any steam line 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause any steam line 
relief valves to open. 
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[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause any turbine 
bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not uncover the pressurizer 
heaters. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause high frequency 
rod stepping. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause any neutron flux 
signals used for automatic control or protection to exceed the value 
corresponding to 103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-
basis dispatched load change pattern shall not cause the steam 
superheat at the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.18] The IRIS plant shall not require CVCS 
boration or dilution operations for automatic axial offset control during 
design-basis dispatched load operations. 
Exception: Dilution to account for burnup is permitted, and may be 
timed to assist in power distribution control. 
[IRIS.DispatchedLoadChange.1.19] The I&C System shall provide for 
automatic axial offset control during design-basis dispatched load 
operations. 
5.1.1.3 FREQUENCY CONTROL 
Grid frequency control is one of the most important factors in maintaining 
electric grid stability, since grid frequency is the fundamental indicator for 
determining the balance between generation and consumption. Nuclear units 
may not participate in controlling grid frequency on large grids, but frequency 
control capability will be essential for small grids and grids with a high nuclear 
generating component. Power plants have three means to address variations in 
grid frequency: remote load dispatching, and local frequency control. Local 
frequency control occurs when the turbine control system uses a frequency 
corrector to respond to grid frequency changes. Unless the grid is particularly 
small, these variations are usually negligible. Typical design limits involve ±1 % 
rms fluctuations, and restrict increases above full power. The frequency 
spectrum associated with the power changes is critical, and most utilities do 
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not have the information needed to specify what their needs are in a useful 
form. 
The design-basis frequency control pattern involves small changes in power 
satisfying the following conditions: 
• Frequency control involves small locally-derived changes in power 
demand to the turbine. These changes are proportional to deviations in 
grid frequency with a 4 percent frequency deviation corresponding to a 
100 percent power change. 
• Frequency control may be superimposed on either (1) a constant power 
demand or (2) the ramp power changes that occur during the design 
basis load follow pattern (both capabilities required). 
• Frequency control may occur simultaneously with dispatched load 
changes. 
• Demanded electric power remains between 20 and 100 percent at all 
times. 
• The demanded power changes are equivalent to a stochastic process with 
a normalized autocorrelation function R(T)=(2/9) Exp[-Abs(T/5)] + (7/9) 
Exp[-Abs(T/0.5)]. T is given in minutes. (The description of the stochastic 
process given here is based on its simplicity rather than on known 
needs. We should gather hard data to define this better). 
• The magnitude of the power changes does not exceed ±1.0 percent rms. 
• The frequency control about a constant power demand can occur at any 
time during the core cycle. 
• The frequency control about the design basis load follow pattern can 
occur at any time in the core cycle that the design basis load follow 
pattern is permitted and achievable (i.e., at least the first 90% of the core 
cycle). 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state (transients associated 
with daily load follow excepted, e.g., I-135 and Xe-135 need not be in 
steady state). 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to frequency control 
operations (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-
basis frequency control pattern. 
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[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the 
design-basis frequency control pattern without requiring manual 
intervention. 
Exception: Routine operations associated with the underlying daily load 
follow. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not create diverging oscillations in any 
plant process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves 
to open. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause any steam line safety valves 
to open. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause any steam line relief valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause any neutron flux signals used 
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for automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
frequency control pattern shall not cause the steam superheat at the 
turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.17] The IRIS plant shall not require CVCS boration 
or dilution operations for automatic axial offset control during design-
basis frequency control operation. 
Exception: Dilution to account for burnup is permitted, and may be 
timed to assist in power distribution control. 
[IRIS.FrequencyControl.1.18] The I&C System shall provide for automatic 
axial offset control during design-basis frequency control operation. 
5.1.2. SPECIAL EVENTS 
5.1.2.1 SYNCHRONIZATION 
Generator synchronization leads to an immediate need to increase turbine load 
to the minimum allowable value for continued operation. The load pickup 
required normally exceeds NSSS loading limits. To avoid exceeding these limits, 
normal practice is to preload the NSSS by using the turbine bypass system. As 
the turbine picks up load, the turbine bypass valves should close accordingly. 
The definition of the design-basis synchronization is as follows: 
• The initiating event is a generator synchronization command (either (1) a 
manual command or (2) an automatic command following a manually 
issued permissive). 
• The normal generator synchronization can occur at any time during the 
core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state with the initial NSSS 
power set greater than the power required for the post-synchronization 
turbine loading. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to synchronization 
operations (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
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[IRIS.Synchronization.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-
basis synchronization. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
with the turbine operating above minimum load, without manual 
intervention. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall stabilize with the turbine bypass valves closed. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.Synchronization.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
synchronization shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
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5.1.2.2 SHORT-TERM LOAD INCREASE 
Utilities desire having the capability to correct overloads of lines tying the grids 
together and, hence, prevent grid breakup. To address this desire, they defined 
the short-term load increase requirements contained here, and placed those 
requirements in the "Utility Requirements Document" which gave requirements 
for the AP600. The URD was ambiguous in defining exactly what the intended 
event was. Apparently, the focus was on making a 20% power change within 
ten minutes of identifying the need for the change. At one point, the URD 
clearly implied that the grid would remain connected; therefore, the 
specification was not for handling islanding situations. The expectation is that 
this capability would be useful during the later life of the plant when it may not 
be the most economical plant and, hence, not base-loaded. Requirements for 
the companion event (involving for load decreases) appear later. 
The definition of the design-basis short-term load increase is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for a monotonic increase in demanded power 
generation of up to 20% in 10 minutes. (The requirement is that there 
must be one acceptable monotonic increase, not that all monotonic 
increases are acceptable). 
• The initial plant electrical output is at least 20% and less than 100%. (If 
the initial power is greater than 80%, the intent is that full power be 
achievable). 
• The final demanded electrical output does not exceed 100%. 
• The load increase can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state (transients associated 
with daily load follow excepted, e.g., I-135 and Xe-135 need not be in 
steady state). 
• The plant has been operating within its design basis load follow 
capability and using the design load follow operating strategy for the 
previous 72 hours. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
• The initial control rod position provides for adequate rod withdrawal 
during the resulting transient. 
This definition does not permit limiting the magnitude of the increase because 
of core power distribution limits, so it is reasonable to assume that the plant is 
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operating within the core's design basis load follow capability. The 72-hour 
assumption ensures that the core iodine-135 and xenon-135 distributions are 
consistent with the load follow capability. Similarly, this definition does not 
permit limiting the magnitude of the increase because of turbine stress limits. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to short-term load 
increases (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
short-term load increase. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load increase shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause any steam line safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause any steam line relief valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to 
open. 
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[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause any neutron flux signals used 
for automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause the parameter used to initiate 
the transient to overshoot its final setting by more than 30% of the 
setting change of the setting change required to initiate a 10% step. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.LoadIncrease.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load increase shall not cause the steam superheat at the 
turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.1.2.3 SHORT-TERM LOAD DECREASE 
Utilities desire having the capability to correct overloads of lines tying the grids 
together and, hence, prevent grid breakup. , and placed those requirements in 
the "Utility Requirements Document" which gave requirements for the AP600. 
The URD was ambiguous in defining exactly what the intended event was. 
Apparently, the focus was on making a 20% power change within ten minutes 
of identifying the need for the change. At one point, the URD clearly implied 
that the grid would remain connected; therefore, the specification was not for 
handling islanding situations. The expectation is that this capability would be 
useful during the later life of the plant when it may not be the most economical 
plant and, hence, not base-loaded. Requirements for the companion event 
(involving for load increases) appeared earlier. 
The definition of the design-basis short-term load decrease is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for a monotonic decrease in demanded power 
generation of up to -20% in 10 minutes. (The requirement is that there 
must be one acceptable monotonic decrease, not that all monotonic 
increases are acceptable). 
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• The initial plant electrical output is greater than 20% and no more than 
100% 
• The final demanded plant electrical output is no less than 20% 
• The load decrease can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state (transients associated 
with daily load follow excepted, e.g., I-135 and Xe-135 need not be in 
steady state). 
• The plant has been operating within its design basis load follow 
capability and using the design load follow operating strategy for the 
previous 72 hours. (This accounts for turbine thermal stress limits as 
well as core limits). 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
Note that definition does not permit limiting the magnitude of the increase 
because of core power distribution limits, so it is reasonable to assume that the 
plant is operating within the core's design basis load follow capability. The 72-
hour assumption ensures that the core iodine-135 and xenon-135 
distributions are consistent with the load follow capability. Similarly, this 
definition does not permit limiting the magnitude of the decrease because of 
turbine stress limits. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to short-term load 
decreases (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
short-term load decrease. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause a turbine trip. 
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[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis short-
term load decrease shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause any steam line safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause any steam line relief valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause any neutron flux signals used 
for automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause the parameter used to initiate 
the transient to undershoot its final setting by more than 30% of the 
setting change of the setting change required to initiate a -10% step. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.LoadDecrease.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
short-term load decrease shall not cause the steam superheat at the 
turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
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5.2. UPSET EVENTS 
5.2.1. EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL DISTURBANCES 
5.2.1.1 GRID ISLANDING - INCREASE 
A grid disturbance outside the plant can separate the plant from the infinite 
grid, and lead to a change in the generator load. This section considers 
transients where the load increases. In general, the load change occurs as a 
step. The magnitude of the change is not known in advance, and there is no 
practical way to measure it directly. Except for the most trivial load changes, 
the resulting mismatch between generation and load will result in a negative 
turbine/generator acceleration. the rate and magnitude of the acceleration 
depends on the size of the island and its load composition, especially the 
fraction of loads represented by rotating equipment. The actions of load 
shedding equipment outside the plant has a strong effect on how the transient 
progresses. Given the uncertainties, it is impractical to guarantee that the 
plant can survive islanding under all reasonable circumstances, so one must 
simply specify a design basis event. Testing a plant's ability to handle grid 
islanding is impractical, so the designers must rely on calculations. 
The definition of the design-basis island mode increase is as follows: 
• The generator is initially delivering power at rated power factor to a finite 
grid with a grid load pickup factor of between (1) 1.17 to 3.5 percent load 
per Hertz for 60 Hz grids, or (2) 1.4 to 4.2 percent load per Hertz for 50 
Hz grids. 
• The load change appears as step increase in electrical load of no more 
than 10 percent. 
• The initial plant electrical output is between 20 and 100 percent. 
• The final grid power consumption does not exceed 100 percent at rated 
frequency. 
• The grid islanding load increase can occur at any time during the core 
cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
• The initial control rod position provides for adequate rod withdrawal 
during the resulting transient. 
• The grid island does NOT have load shedding equipment. 
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The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to grid islanding load 
increases (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.Islanding.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not create diverging oscillations in any 
plant process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load increase shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
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Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.Islanding.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding increase shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine 
inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.1.2 GRID ISLANDING - DECREASE 
A grid disturbance outside the plant can separate the plant from the infinite 
grid, and lead to a change in the generator load. This section considers 
transients where the load decreases. In general, the load change occurs as a 
step. The magnitude of the change is not known in advance, and there is no 
practical way to measure it directly. Except for the most trivial load changes, 
the resulting mismatch between generation and load will result in a positive 
turbine/generator acceleration. The rate and magnitude of the acceleration 
depends on the size of the island and its load composition, especially the 
fraction of loads represented by rotating equipment. For load reductions of 
more than about 25 percent, grid disconnection on high frequency occurs 
within seconds. Most of the increase is due to steam that is already in the 
turbine when event occurs, so there is little that the control system can do to 
prevent the increase. Given the uncertainties, it is impractical to guarantee 
that the plant can survive islanding under all reasonable circumstances, so 
one must simply specify a design basis event. Testing a plant's ability to handle 
grid islanding is impractical, so the designers must rely on calculations. 
The definition of the design-basis island mode decrease is as follows: 
• The generator is initially delivering power at rated power factor to a finite 
grid with a grid load pickup factor of between (1) 1.17 to 3.5 percent load 
per Hertz for 60 Hz grids, or (2) 1.4 to 4.2 percent load per Hertz for 50 
Hz grids. 
• The load change appears as a step decrease in electrical load of no more 
than 20 percent. 
• The initial plant electrical output is between 20 and 100 percent. 
• The final grid power consumption is at least 20 percent at rated 
frequency. 
• The grid islanding load decrease can occur at any time during the core 
cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
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The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to grid islanding load 
decreases (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.Islanding.2] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not create diverging oscillations in any 
plant process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding load decrease shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
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[IRIS.Islanding.2.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine 
inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.Islanding.2.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis grid 
islanding decrease shall lead to frequency stabilizing in the range of (1) 
59.5 to 60.5 Hz for 60-hz grids, or (2) 49.5 to 50.5 Hz. for 50-hz grids. 
5.2.1.3 STEP LOAD REDUCTION TO HOUSE LOAD 
This event refers to opening any breaker that removes all off-site loads from the 
generator. This severs grid synchronization, so the turbine control system 
must revert to some form of speed control. Any plant loads receiving ac power 
from the generator will see changes in their supply frequency. The step load 
reduction to house load event differs from islanding (partial load rejection) 
event in two respects: first, monitoring the breaker position and generator MWe 
allows one to know the time, direction, and magnitude of the load change; and 
second, the grid frequency does not determine turbine speed. The step load 
reduction to house load event differs from the generator breaker trip event in 
assuming that house loads are connected to the generator. The house loads 
will probably be less than the minimum allowed turbine load, so the operator 
will probably trip the generator at some point. 
The definition of the design-basis step load reduction to house load is as 
follows: 
• A load change results from tripping the breakers tying the unit to the 
grid. 
• A house load defined as 5% of rated power remains connected to the 
generator. 
• The initial plant electrical output is greater than house load. 
• The initial plant electrical output is no less than the minimum allowed 
steady-state turbine load. 
• The initial plant electrical output is no more than 100%. 
• The step load reduction to house load can occur at any time during the 
core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
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The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to step load 
reductions to house load (from a control and operations perspective) are as 
follows: 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
step load reduction to house load. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady 
state condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not create diverging oscillations in 
any plant process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, 
etc.). 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause any pressurizer safety 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause any steam line safety 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause any steam line relief valves 
to open. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause any turbine bypass valves 
to remain open in the final quasi-steady-state. 
Exception: If decay heat exceeds the thermal power necessary to 
maintain house load, then the turbine bypass valves may 
remain open to relieve the difference. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause high frequency rod 
stepping. 
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[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause any neutron flux signals 
used for automatic control or protection to exceed the value 
corresponding to 103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall not cause the steam superheat at 
the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.LoadRejection.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load reduction to house load shall lead to frequency stabilizing in the 
range of (1) 59.5 to 60.5 Hz for 60-hz grids, or (2) 49.5 to 50.5 Hz. for 
50-hz grids. 
5.2.1.4 TURBINE FAST VALVING 
Turbine fast valving is a technique used to enhance grid stability by allowing 
the generator to maintain synchronization under certain grid fault (short 
circuit) conditions. In particular, fast valving reduces the turbine power-
generator power mismatch so that the electrical system has more time to clear 
the fault. The electrical system initiates fast valving; the operator cannot do so. 
Fast valving is normally blocked except at high power. A typical fast valving 
event closes the turbine throttle valves at maximum speed, holds them closed 
for a few seconds, and then opens them at a rapid (yet not maximum) rate 
until turbine load returns to nearly its original value. It is impractical to design 
a system that can withstand all grid faults without tripping the unit on 
electrical conditions. For IRIS, we require that the turbine and reactor systems 
be able to handle the transient if the electrical system does. 
The definition of the design-basis turbine fast valving event is as follows: 
• The initiating event is a three-phase short circuit. For non-electrical 
design purposes, assume that the short circuit occurs at the generator 
terminals. 
• The electrical system clears the fault before the generator acceleration 
violates the equal angle criteria. For non-electrical design purposes, 
assume that the generator remains synchronized. 
• The initial plant electrical output is at least 80 percent power and at 
rated power factor. 
• The maximum transmittable power following the event is between 70 and 
100 percent of the transmittable power before the event. 
• The remaining connected tie line capacity following the event is at least 
60 percent of rated plant output. 
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• The final grid power consumption does not exceed 100 percent at rated 
frequency. 
• The short circuit can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to turbine fast valving 
events (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.FastValving.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
turbine fast valving. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant process 
variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause a turbine runback. 
Exception: The design may use a turbine runback to bring the final 
plant power output down to the remaining connected tie line 
capacity with a (+0%, -5%) tolerance on the setting. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause a generator trip. 
Exception: A generator trip may occur if required to clear the short. If 
this occurs, consider this to be a generator trip event and 
apply the corresponding acceptance criteria. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.8] The frequency transient resulting from the design-
basis turbine fast valving shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
Exception: Grid disconnect may occur if required to clear the short. If 
this occurs, consider this to be a step load reduction to 
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house load event and apply the corresponding acceptance 
criteria. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.FastValving.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
fast valving shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine inlet to 
drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.2. REACTOR, TURBINE, AND GENERATOR TRIPS 
5.2.2.1 NORMAL REACTOR TRIP 
A reactor trip results in reactor shutdown. Upon detecting a reactor trip, the 
turbine protection system trips the turbine soon after. Rod control and turbine 
throttle valve control no longer operate, but most other reactor control 
functions continue in one form or another. This section considers a reactor trip 
from an I&C operations point-of-view rather than an accident analysis point-of-
view. Proper control system operation reduces the severity of the transient that 
follows a reactor trip; however, the accident analyses cannot credit the 
beneficial aspects of proper control system operation. The requirements 
presented here take such credit, so the initiating event and corresponding 
acceptance criteria presented here are different from those assumed in the 
accident analyses. 
The definition of the design-basis normal reactor trip is as follows: 
• The initiating event is a manual reactor trip command. 
• The normal reactor trip can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
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The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to normal reactor trips 
(from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
normal reactor trip. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant process 
variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall include a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall stabilize with the turbine bypass valves stabilized at 
the position needed to remove decay heat. 
[IRIS.ReactorTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
reactor trip shall not cause uncovering of the pressurizer heaters. 
5.2.2.2 NORMAL TURBINE TRIP 
A turbine trip introduces a sudden and complete termination of the principal 
thermal load on the NSSS, leading to the most severe anticipated transient not 
involving a reactor trip. IRIS must handle a turbine trip at full power without 
reactor trip. Turbine throttle valve control no longer operates after the trip, but 
most reactor control functions continue in one form or another. This section 
considers a turbine trip from an I&C operations point-of-view rather than an 
accident analysis point-of-view. Proper control system operation reduces the 
severity of the transient that follows a turbine trip; however, the accident 
analyses cannot credit the beneficial aspects of proper control system 
operation. The requirements presented here take such credit, so the initiating 
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event and corresponding acceptance criteria are different from those assumed 
in the accident analyses. 
The definition of the design-basis normal turbine trip is as follows: 
• The initiating event is a manual turbine trip command. 
• The normal turbine trip can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to normal turbine 
trips (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
normal turbine trip. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant process 
variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis turbine 
trip shall stabilize with the turbine bypass valves stabilized at the 
position needed to remove decay heat. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis normal 
turbine trip shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
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[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
turbine trip shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.TurbineTrip.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
turbine trip shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
5.2.2.3 NORMAL GENERATOR TRIP 
Opening the generator breaker removes all electrical loads from the generator. 
This severs generator-to-grid synchronization, so the turbine control system 
must revert to some form of speed control. This event differs from the step load 
reduction to house load event in that house loads are disconnected from the 
generator. The grid remains available as an electrical power source, and grid 
frequency remains, for all practical purposes, at its nominal value. 
The definition of the design-basis normal generator trip is as follows: 
• The load change results from tripping the generator output breaker. 
• The generator trip can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• Relevant plant electrical loads are transferred to (or remain connected to) 
the grid and subsequently receive power at nominal grid frequency. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
• The initial plant electrical output is no more than 100%. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to normal generator 
trips (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
normal generator trip. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not create diverging oscillations in any 
plant process variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, 
etc.). 
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[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause any steam line safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause any steam line relief valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall shall not cause any turbine bypass valves 
to remain open in the final quasi-steady-state. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.GeneratorTrip.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
normal generator trip shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
5.2.3. LOSS OF MAJOR PLANT COMPONENTS 
5.2.3.1 LOSS OF A RUNNING MAIN REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 
The appropriate plant response to tripping a main reactor coolant pump 
depends on the initial power and the number of pumps in service. IRIS 
operates with eight main reactor coolant pumps in service at full power. Since 
the steam generators are connected in pairs, tripping one main reactor coolant 
pump requires tripping the one associated with the paired steam generator. 
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The definition of the design-basis loss of a running main reactor coolant pump 
is as follows: 
• The loss of a running main reactor coolant pump is equivalent to 
manually tripping the affected pump (i.e., it is not due to causes external 
to the pump). 
• The loss of a running main reactor coolant pump can occur at any time 
during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• The number of operating main reactor coolant pumps is the full 
compliment normally operating at full power. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to loss of a running 
main reactor coolant pump (from a control and operations perspective) are as 
follows: 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis loss 
of a running main reactor coolant pump. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall bring the plant to a quasi-
steady state condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not create diverging 
oscillations in any plant process variables (i.e., temperatures, 
pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
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[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause any pressurizer 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause any steam line 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause any steam line 
relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause any turbine bypass 
valves to remain open in the final quasi-steady-state. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause high frequency rod 
stepping. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of a 
running main reactor coolant pump shall not cause the steam 
superheat at the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
[IRIS.RCPTrip.1.14] The design-basis loss of a running main reactor coolant 
pump shall result in tripping the main reactor coolant pump associated 
with the paired steam generator. 
5.2.3.2 LOSS OF A RUNNING MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP 
The appropriate plant response to tripping a feedwater pump depends on the 
initial power and the number of pumps in service. IRIS operates with two 
feedwater pumps in service at full power. 
The definition of the design-basis loss of a running main feedwater pump is as 
follows: 
• The loss of a running main feedwater pump is equivalent to manually 
tripping the affected pump (i.e., it is not due to causes external to the 
pump). 
• The loss of a running main feedwater pump can occur at any time during 
the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• The number of operating feedwater pumps is the full compliment 
normally operating at full power. 
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• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to loss of a running 
main feedwater pump (from a control and operations perspective) are as 
follows: 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
loss of a running main feedwater pump. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady 
state condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not create diverging oscillations 
in any plant process variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, 
levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause any pressurizer safety 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss of 
a running main feedwater pump shall not cause any steam line safety 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a running main feedwater pump shall not cause any steam line relief 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a running main feedwater pump shall not cause any turbine bypass 
valves to remain open in the final quasi-steady-state. 
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[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a running main feedwater pump shall not uncover the pressurizer 
heaters. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a running main feedwater pump shall not cause high frequency rod 
stepping. 
[IRIS.FWPumpTrip.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a running main feedwater pump shall not cause the steam superheat 
at the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.3.3 LOSS OF A RUNNING CONDENSATE PUMP 
The appropriate plant response to tripping a condensate pump depends on the 
initial power and the number of pumps in service. IRIS has three condensate 
pumps and operates with two pumps in service at full power. The third pump 
can start automatically if one of the operating pumps trips. 
The definition of the design-basis loss of a running condensate pump is as 
follows: 
• The loss of a running condensate pump is equivalent to manually 
tripping the affected pump (i.e., it is not due to causes external to the 
pump). 
• The loss of a running condensate pump can occur at any time during the 
core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• The number of operating condensate pumps is the full complement 
normally operating at full power. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to loss of a running 
condensate pump (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the 
design-basis loss of a running condensate pump. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall bring the plant to a 
quasi-steady state condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not create diverging 
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oscillations in any plant process variables (i.e., temperatures, 
pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause ESF 
actuation. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a turbine 
runback. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a generator 
trip. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a grid 
disconnect. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause a feedwater 
pump trip. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause any 
pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause any steam 
line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause any steam 
line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause any turbine 
bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not uncover the 
pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause high 
frequency rod stepping. 
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[IRIS.CondensatePumpTrip.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-
basis loss of a running condensate pump shall not cause the steam 
superheat at the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.3.4 INADVERTENT FEEDWATER VALVE CLOSURE  
Feedwater valve failures involve inadvertent opening or closing of a feedwater 
valve. The appropriate plant response to inadvertent feedwater valve closure is 
to reduce power. The IRIS plant should be able to handle this event while 
remaining on line. 
The definition of the design-basis inadvertent feedwater valve closure is as 
follows: 
• The inadvertent feedwater valve closure is equivalent to a step reduction 
in feedwater flow to the affected steam generators, neglecting momentum 
effects (e.g., no water hammer opr acoustic wave phenomena). 
• The inadvertent feedwater valve closure can occur at any time during the 
core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• The number of operating feedwater valves is the full compliment 
normally operating at full power. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to an inadvertent 
feedwater valve closure (from a control and operations perspective) are as 
follows: 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-
basis inadvertent feedwater valve closure. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall bring the plant to a quasi-
steady state condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not create diverging 
oscillations in any plant process variables (i.e., temperatures, 
pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause ESF actuation. 
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[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause any pressurizer 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause any steam line 
safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause any steam line relief 
valves to open. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not uncover the pressurizer 
heaters. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause high frequency rod 
stepping. 
[IRIS.FWValveClosure.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
inadvertent feedwater valve closure shall not cause the steam 
superheat at the turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.3.5 LOSS OF A FEEDWATER HEATER 
According to preliminary information, an IRIS unit will have two low-pressure 
feedwater heater trains, a deaerating feedwater heater, and one pair of high-
pressure feedwater heaters 
Controlled removal of one or more groups of feedwater heaters does not result 
in significant plant transients requiring automatic control action. The loss of a 
feedwater heater event refers to the uncontrolled loss of feedwater heating 
resulting from the inadvertent closing of one of the extraction steam supply 
valves. 
The definition of the design-basis loss of a feedwater heater is as follows: 
• The loss of a feedwater heater results from closing the extraction steam 
supply. 
• The tube-side flow path through the heaters remains open. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
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• The number of operating feedwater heaters is the full complement 
normally operating at power. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to loss of a feedwater 
heater (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
loss of a feedwater heater. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state 
condition without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause any steam line safety valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause any steam line relief valves to 
open. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to 
open. 
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[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.FWHeaterLoss.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis loss 
of a feedwater heater shall not cause the steam superheat at the 
turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.2.4. MISCELLANEOUS UPSETS 
5.2.4.1 UNINTENDED CONTROL ROD DROP 
IRIS should be designed to accommodate the following events associated with 
an unintended control rod drop. 
• No scram upon dropping a control rod 
• Operation at reduced power for four hours with any single control rod 
drive fully inserted; 
• Recover rod without initiating a scram or exceeding fuel design limits. 
This addresses a limitation of most earlier PWRs in which a rod drop 
automatically initiates a reactor scram or the technical specifications require 
that the plant be at cold shutdown within a short time. Providing the capability 
for continued operation, despite an unintended single rod drop, will improve 
the plant capacity factor and reduce the wear associated with a shutdown and 
startup cycle. The first bullet, "no scram upon dropping a control rod," is the 
only one directly addressed by the I&C System. 
The definition of the design-basis unintended control rod drop is as follows: 
• A single control rod drops due to malfunctions whose sole direct effect is 
to initiate the single control rod drop. 
• The initial plant electrical output does not exceed 100%. 
• The unintended control rod drop can occur at any time during the core 
cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
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• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems other than the reactor control rods are in 
automatic control. The reactor control rods may be in automatic or 
manual. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to an unintended 
control rod drop (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
Exception: The operator will recover the control rod manually. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e., temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis unintended 
control rod drop shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall not cause any steam line relief valves 
to open. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall stabilize with the turbine bypass 
valves closed. 
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[IRIS.RodDrop.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall not cause high frequency rod 
stepping. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall not cause any neutron flux signals 
used for automatic control or protection to exceed the value 
corresponding to 103% of licensed power. 
Exception: This requirement applies only to design analyses. It does not 
apply to plant startup tests. 
[IRIS.RodDrop.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis 
unintended control rod drop shall not cause the steam superheat at the 
turbine inlet to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.3. REFERENCE EVENTS 
The events listed in this section traditionally are used for PWR design 
purposes. They are artificial transients intended only for control system 
performance evaluation. They do not necessarily represent realistic events for 
any electric power generating station. We wrote these acceptance criteria for 
control and protection system analysis only. None of these events or their 
acceptance criteria belongs as part of the initial plant startup tests. 
5.3.1. STEP LOAD INCREASE 
The 10 percent step load increase transient traditionally used for PWR design 
purposes is an artificial transient intended only for control system performance 
evaluation. It does not represent a realistic transient for an electric power 
generating station. In practice, there can only be two ways to initiate such a 
transient: 
• Have the operator initiate the transient: One would be hard-pressed to 
suggest a scenario where such a large load change would be required 
and the precise magnitude and timing known in advance. Expected load 
changes can invariably be accommodated by slower ramp load changes. 
Many plants do not allow the operator to request step load changes; 
instead, they restrict the operator's actions to limit load changes to the 
design ramp rate. 
• Have the plant respond to sudden grid load changes: A grid disturbance 
outside the plant can separate the plant from the infinite grid, and lead 
to a change in the generator load. The only mechanism available for 
detecting sudden grid load changes is the sudden change in grid 
frequency. By convention, these are "islanding events." 
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Although step load changes are not realistic transients, designers analyze them 
for several reasons. First, and most important, they are among the best 
transients for evaluating control system performance characteristics such as 
overshoot, damping ratio, and settling time. Second, and of less importance, 
step load changes generally result in larger excursions from nominal plant 
conditions than the ramp load changes do, so they are useful indicators of 
worse-case bounds on the margins to certain reactor trip set points and other 
plant limits. Normal analysis practice requires that the starting and ending 
powers lie within the normal maneuvering range and that the initial conditions 
are nominal conditions with perhaps some deliberate bias for conservatism. 
The definition of the design-basis step load increase is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for an instantaneous increase in demanded 
power generation of up to 10 percent of guaranteed electrical output. 
• The initial plant electrical output is at least 20 percent. 
• The final demanded output does not exceed 100%. 
• The step load increase can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
• The initial control rod position provides for adequate rod withdrawal 
during the resulting transient. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to step load increases 
(from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
[IRIS.StepChange.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
step load increase. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant process 
variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause a reactor trip. 
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[IRIS.StepChange.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause the parameter used to initiate the 
transient to overshoot its final setting by more than 30% of the setting 
change. 
[IRIS.StepChange.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load increase shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine inlet 
to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.3.2. STEP LOAD DECREASE 
The 10 percent step load decrease transient described here is an artificial 
transient used for control system performance evaluation, and does not 
represent a realistic transient for an electric power generating station. In 
practice, there can only be two ways to initiate such a transient: 
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• Have the operator initiate the transient: One would be hard-pressed to 
suggest a scenario where such a large load change would be required 
and the precise magnitude and timing known in advance. Expected load 
changes can invariably be accommodated by slower ramp load changes. 
Many plants do not allow the operator to request step load changes; 
instead, they restrict the operator's actions to limit load changes to the 
design ramp rate. 
• Have the plant respond to sudden grid load changes: A grid disturbance 
outside the plant can separate the plant from the infinite grid, and lead 
to a change in the generator load. The only mechanism available for 
detecting sudden grid load changes is the sudden change in grid 
frequency. By convention, these are classified as islanding events and 
excluded from the definition of step load changes. 
Although step load changes are not realistic transients, designers analyze them 
for several reasons. First, and most important, they are among the best 
transients for evaluating control system performance characteristics such as 
overshoot, damping ratio, and settling time. Second, and of less importance, 
step load changes generally result in larger excursions from nominal plant 
conditions than the ramp load changes do, so they are useful indicators of 
worse-case bounds on the margins to certain reactor trip set points and other 
plant limits. Normal analysis practice requires that the starting and ending 
powers lie within the normal maneuvering range and that the initial conditions 
are nominal conditions with perhaps some deliberate bias for conservatism. 
The definition of the design-basis step load decrease is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for an instantaneous decrease in demanded 
power generation of up to 10 percent of guaranteed electrical output. 
• The initial plant electrical output does not exceed 100%. 
• The final demanded output is at least 20 percent. 
• The step load decrease can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to step load decreases 
(from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
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[IRIS.StepChange.2] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
step load decrease. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause the parameter used to initiate the 
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transient to undershoot its final setting by more than 30% of the 
setting change. 
[IRIS.StepChange.2.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis step 
load decrease shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine inlet 
to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.3.3. RAMP LOAD INCREASE 
Ramp load changes are the normal method for changing plant generation. Most 
power plant vendors specify ramp load change capabilities as part of their 
contractual guarantees. The plant ramp rate limit is generally determined by 
component limits factors, often either turbine loading limits or component 
thermal stress limits. In practice, most grids do not require that their nuclear 
units execute fast ramps over large ranges. The magnitude of the ramp load 
increase is deliberately left undefined in these requirements because the utility 
requirement for rapid load changes is defined as a separate event, specifically, 
the short-term load increase. 
The definition of the design-basis ramp load increase is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for a uniform ramp increase in demanded 
power generation at a rate of up to 5 percent-per-minute of guaranteed 
electrical output. 
• The magnitude of the ramp load increase may be subject to core power 
distribution limits. 
• The magnitude of the ramp load increase may be subject to turbine 
stress limits. 
• The initial plant electrical output is at least 20% and less than 100%. 
• The final demanded electrical output does not exceed 100%. 
• The ramp load increase can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
• The initial control rod position provides for adequate rod withdrawal 
during the resulting transient. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to ramp load increases 
(from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
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[IRIS.RampChange.1] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
ramp load increase. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant process 
variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause the parameter used to initiate the 
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transient to overshoot its final setting by more than 30% of the setting 
change required to initiate a 10% step. 
[IRIS.RampChange.1.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load increase shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine inlet 
to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
5.3.4. RAMP LOAD DECREASE 
Ramp load changes are the normal method for changing plant generation. Most 
power plant vendors specify ramp load change capabilities as part of their 
contractual guarantees. The plant ramp rate limit is generally determined by 
component limits factors, often either turbine loading limits or component 
thermal stress limits. In practice, most grids do not require that their nuclear 
units execute fast ramps over large ranges. The magnitude of the ramp load 
decrease is deliberately left undefined in these requirements because the utility 
requirement for rapid load changes is defined as a separate event, specifically, 
the short-term load decrease. 
The definition of the design-basis ramp load decrease is as follows: 
• A load change results from an operator request to the supervisory control 
system. 
• The load change request is for a uniform ramp decrease in demanded 
power generation at a rate of up to -5 percent-per-minute of guaranteed 
electrical output. 
• The initial plant electrical output is greater than 20% and no more than 
100% 
• The final demanded plant electrical output is no less than 20% 
• The ramp load decrease can occur at any time during the core cycle. 
• The magnitude of the ramp load decrease may be subject to core power 
distribution limits. 
• The magnitude of the ramp load decrease may be subject to turbine 
stress limits. 
• The plant initial condition is quasi-steady state. 
• All relevant process variables begin at their nominal values for the initial 
plant power. 
• All relevant plant systems are operational and remain so. 
• All relevant I&C systems are in automatic control. 
The specific requirements defining acceptable responses to ramp load 
decreases (from a control and operations perspective) are as follows: 
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[IRIS.RampChange.2] The IRIS plant shall be able to perform the design-basis 
ramp load decrease. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.1] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall bring the plant to a quasi-steady state condition 
without manual intervention. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.2] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not create diverging oscillations in any plant 
process variables (i.e. temperatures, pressures, flows, levels, etc.). 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.3] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause a reactor trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.4] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause ESF actuation. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.5] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause a turbine trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.6] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause a turbine runback. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.7] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause a generator trip. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.8] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause a grid disconnect. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.9] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause any pressurizer safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.10] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause any steam line safety valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.11] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause any steam line relief valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.12] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause any turbine bypass valves to open. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.13] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not uncover the pressurizer heaters. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.14] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause high frequency rod stepping. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.15] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause any neutron flux signals used for 
automatic control or protection to exceed the value corresponding to 
103% of licensed power. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.16] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause the parameter used to initiate the 
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transient to undershoot its final setting by more than 30% of the 
setting change of the setting change required to initiate a -10% step. 
[IRIS.RampChange.2.17] The transient resulting from the design-basis ramp 
load decrease shall not cause the steam superheat at the turbine inlet 
to drop below 25 Celsius degrees. 
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Initial Conditions
Quasi-steady state X X
(except load 
follow variables)
X
(except load 
follow variables)
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Electrical power >=50%
<=100%
>=50%
<=100%
>=20%
<=100%
0% >=20%
<100%
>20%
<=100%
>=20%
<100%
>20%
<=100%
>house load
>=min turbine 
load
<=100%
>=80%
<=100%
<=100% <=100% <=100% <=100% <=100% <=100% <=100% <=100% >=20%
<100%
>=20%
<100%
>=20%
<100%
>=20%
<100%
Time in core life <=90% Any (centered on 
constant power); 
<=90% (with load 
follow)
Any (centered on 
constant power); 
<=90% (with load 
follow)
Any Any (centered on 
constant power); 
<=90% (with load 
follow)
Any (centered on 
constant power); 
<=90% (with load 
follow)
Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any
Process variables Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal
Plant Systems Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational
I&C Systems Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic
(control rods may 
be in manual)
Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic
Other: - - - - Sufficient initial 
rod insertion.
Plant operating 
within design load 
follow capability
Plant operating 
within design load 
follow capability
Sufficient initial 
rod insertion.
No credit for grid 
load shedding 
equipment.
- For design, house 
load defined as 
Qel=5%
- - - - Normal full-power 
complement of 
reactor coolant 
pumps are 
running
Normal full-power 
complement of 
feedwater pumps 
are running
Normal full-power 
complement of 
condensate 
pumps are 
running
Normal full-power 
complement of 
feedwater heaters 
are in service
- Sufficient initial 
rod insertion
- Sufficient initial 
rod insertion
-
Initiating Event: Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Small (+-5%) 
changes in 
electric power 
demand, 
superimposed on 
(1) constant 
power demand or 
(2) load follow, 
either case either 
with or without 
simultaneous 
frequency control.
Small (+-1%) 
changes in 
electric power 
demand, 
superimposed on 
(1) constant 
power demand or 
(2) load follow, 
either case either 
with or without 
simultaneous 
dispatched load 
changes.
Synchronization 
command
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Grid islanding 
event with load 
increase of no 
more than 10%
Grid islanding 
event with load 
decrease of no 
more than 20%
Grid breaker(s) 
trip
Three-phase 
short circuit at the 
generator 
terminals
Manual reactor 
trip
Manual turbine 
trip
Manual generator 
breaker trip
Manual reactor 
coolant pump trip
Manual feedwater 
pump trip
Manual 
condensate pump 
trip
Terminate steam 
supply to a 
feedwater heater
Unintended 
control rod drop
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Operator request 
to supervisory 
control system
Special Conditions: I&C systems must 
provide automatic 
axial offset 
control.
I&C systems must 
provide automatic 
axial offset 
control.
I&C systems must 
provide automatic 
axial offset 
control.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Core power 
distribution may 
limit ramp's 
magnitude.
Core power 
distribution may 
limit ramp's 
magnitude.
Time frame likely to be
of greatest interest:
4-7 days 6 to 10 peak-to-
peak swings
5 to 10 peak-to-
peak swings
10 min 20 min 20 min 10 min 10 min 20 min 10 min 30 min 30 min 30 min 20 min 20 min 20 min 20 min 10 min 10 min 10 min Ramp duration 
plus 5 min
Ramp duration 
plus 5 min
Transient Constraints
No manual intervention X
(except routine)
X
(except routine)
X
(except routine)
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
(except manual 
rod recovery)
X X X X
No diverging oscillations X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
No reactor trip X X X X X X X X X X - X X X X X X X X X X X
No ESF actuation X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
No turbine trip X X X X X X X X X X - - X X X X X X X X X X
No turbine runback X X X X X X X X - X
(see exception)
- - - - - X X - X X X X
No generator trip X X X X X X X X X X
(see exception)
- - - X X X X X X X X X
No grid disconnect X X X X X X X X - X
(see exception)
X X X X X X X X X X X X
No feedwater pump trip - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - - -
Don't open Pzr SVs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Don't open SG SVs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Don't open SG RVs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Don't open turbine bypass 
valves
X X X - X X X - - - - - - - - - - - X X X X
Don't uncover Pzr heaters X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
No HF rod stepping X X X X X X X X X X - X X X X X X X X X X X
Don't exceed 103% Qn X X X X X X X X X X - X X - - - - X X X X X
Don't exceed over/under-
shoot in initiating 
parameter of more than 
30% of change required 
for 10% step.
X - - - X X - - - - - - - - - - - - X X X X
Maintain 25 degC 
superheat at the turbine 
inlet
X X X - X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X
No CVCS boration or 
dilution for axial offset 
control
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Final conditions:
Quasi-steady state X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Other: - - - Turbine bypass 
valves close.
Final requested 
power <=100%
Final requested 
power >=20%
Final requested 
power <=100%
Final requested 
power >=20%
Turbine bypass 
valves close if 
house load >= 
decay heat
Turbine bypass 
valves close.
Turbine bypass 
valves open to 
remove decay 
heat
Turbine bypass 
valves open to 
remove decay 
heat
Turbine bypass 
valves close.
Turbine bypass 
valves close.
Turbine bypass 
valves close.
- - Turbine bypass 
valves close.
Final requested 
power <=100%
Final requested 
power >=15%
Final requested 
power <=100%
Final requested 
power >=15%
Another: - - - Turbine carrying 
more than 
minimum allowed 
turbine load.
- - - For 60 Hz grids:
fgen>=59.5 Hz
fgen<=60.5 Hz
For 60 Hz grids:
fgen>=59.5 Hz
fgen<=60.5 Hz
- Turbine trips - - Paired reactor 
coolant pump 
trips
- - - - - - - -
Yet another: - - - - - - - For 50 Hz grids:
fgen>=49.5 Hz
fgen<=50.5 Hz
For 50 Hz grids:
fgen>=49.5 Hz
fgen<=50.5 Hz
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
Figure 1: Summary of Maneuverability Requirements
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6. SUMMARY 
The current vision for IPSR deployment includes multi-unit sites and the 
possibility of coupling the plant with co-generation modules such as desalination, 
district heating, and industrial steam. Earlier work outlined concepts for 
controlling single units for electric power generation. The present study is 
investigating supervisory control of all units at a single site with the twin (and 
possibly competing) objectives of simplifying operation and/or optimizing the 
operational economics of the site suite, especially when the site objectives augment 
electric power generation with desalination or other goals. 
We continue to look at the plant maneuvering requirements proposed in 2004. 
When necessary, we modify them to account for new operational considerations 
and knowledge gained during the design process. We continue to refine the low-
level and unit control strategies, and continue to investigate concepts for multi-
unit control. One promising approach is to tailor standard economic dispatch 
algorithms to fit the single-site, multi-unit environment. These algorithms perform 
a constrained economic optimization to determine each units preferred output on a 
minute-by-minute basis. In the 1980s, Westinghouse developed concepts to update 
the constraints used in the optimization continuously. We envision using similar 
techniques for IRIS. At the same time, advanced control concepts may allow one to 
relax some of the traditional constraints. One example is automated axial power 
distribution control using multiple control rod groups, which eliminates load follow 
constraints imposed by boron dilution limits. The second is dynamic deadbands 
for short-term load changes, which allow larger fluctuations while limiting key 
component wear, particularly associated with the control rod drives. 
We reviewed the impact of using turbine extraction steam for desalination and 
district heating. The options currently preferred would require perhaps 5 percent of 
the NSSS thermal output and result in an electric power output reduction of 
roughly half that percentage. By comparison, the Temelín plant supports district 
heating of up to roughly 11 percent of rated thermal power. Temelín manages to 
control district heating through balance-of-plant controls only, without any 
interface with the unit’s Control Coordinator or NSSS controls. By analogy, we 
expect that using turbine extraction steam for desalination or district heating 
would demand little or no special consideration by the IRIS Supervisory or NSSS 
controls. 
Multi-unit control would provide the greatest benefit if there were one operating 
staff charged with controlling all modules on a site. This is common practice in 
some industries, but not in commercial nuclear power. The key is to limit staff 
workload by providing a high level of unit and site automation. We will review the 
human factors implications separately as part of the Task 5 effort. 
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